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LIMITING SECRET SETTLEMENTS BY LAW
David Luban*
I'm in the most embarrassing, impossible situation for a commenta-
tor-namely, agreeing fundamentally with what the principal speaker
said. In fact, I wrote an article against secret settlements in the
GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL in 1995.1 If Monroe Freedman were here,
he would explain to us that progress in ideas comes from contention and
the testing of hypotheses by marshalling the strongest arguments against
them. Since he's not, I will nevertheless take that as my charge. Despite
the fact that I agree with Richard on the ethical drawbacks of secret set-
tlements, I'd like to begin by talking about what I think are the strongest
arguments on behalf of secret settlements and against a sunshine-in-liti-
gation regime.
It seems to me that there are three basic arguments. One is simply a
kind of right to privacy argument. Those of you who read the cover
story in the ABA JOURNAL about secret settlements will discover that
almost all of the litigation to unseal court files is brought by the mass
media. At least a substantial proportion of those cases have nothing to
do with health and safety. What they have to do with are things like
finding out all of the dirt that is in the file about Clint Eastwood's love
life, or all of the dirt in the personal life of the Minnesota Vikings' coach.
I am one of those who believes that the First Amendment grants no rights
to news organizations to gain access to whatever sells newspapers or
stops a channel-surfing viewer from switching the stations. It seems to
me that there is a real worry about mere gossip, "infotainment" that
comes from prying around in files; and worry about embarrassment is a
genuine one.
It's not just a worry about defendants being embarrassed. It can be
a worry that plaintiffs face as well. Those of you who are familiar with
the Dalkon Shield litigation will remember that A.H. Robbins' lawyers
tried to intimidate women, to prevent them from pursuing their Dalkon
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Shield lawsuits by asking them what the lawyers nicknamed "the dirty
questions" at their depositions. Questions were asked about the names
and addresses of all their sexual partners, about their sexual habits, about
their hygienic habits. The clear implication was that this was information
that would enter the public domain if they went forward with their law
suits, and it seems to me that it's quite appropriate in those cases to
worry about privacy.
Defendants have a particular worry about privacy because, unlike
the plaintiff, they are dragged into the court. In a sunshine-in-litigation
regime, they must either concede the lawsuit, or tolerate their files get-
ting open. And I think that's one of the complaints that critics of open
settlements make.
In response to such worries, it seems to me crucial that Richard's
proposed rule concerns only health and safety information, not personal
information. I assume that he would agree that if the purpose of open
settlements is merely to dig out dirt and gossip, there is really no place
for that. So I don't really think this is a criticism of his rule.
As for the fact that defendants might have to make a hard choice
between conceding a lawsuit and opening their files, the law does con-
front those whose conduct is not innocent with hard choices. That's a
fact of life, and it is not necessarily bad. One hard choice that the law
has been perfectly sanguine about is parallel civil and criminal proceed-
ings, where a civil defendant may have to choose between throwing in
the towel on a civil lawsuit or defending it and thereby waiving the right
against self-incrimination. I think that is an appropriate hard choice for
the law to put to defendants and, by analogy, I think that the choice to
"throw in the towel or open your files" might be an appropriate one to
put to defendants if they are concealing health and safety information.
A second possible objection to Richard Zitrin's rule is an argument
having to do with compassion for this particular plaintiff who may be
seriously injured, who needs compensation, and who is offered generous
compensation at no risk of the anguish and possibility of defeat of trial, if
only he will settle. Out of compassion, both his lawyer and the judge
might feel a tremendous incentive not to say, "Tough-because there's
health and safety information, you have to run the risks of trial." In
response to that criticism, I would turn the argument around. It's bad
public policy to build law around hard cases-where, of course, the orig-
inal meaning of "hard cases" was not a difficult case to decide but a case
that wrings our heart strings. I think that Richard is right. It's bad public
policy to conceal health and safety information so that one person can get
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more compensation. We cannot expect the judge or that plaintiff's law-
yer to make that decision. That's why a rule is appropriate.
Third (and I think that, jurisprudentially, this is the most interesting
argument) is the argument that our courts are really for private dispute
resolution. They are not clearing houses of information. To that the
response is that the argument misconceives the nature of what the courts
are for. Courts are not just there to take cases, process them, and ship
them out. Otherwise it would be hard to explain why courts produce
written opinions about cases. The point is that the court system is not a
system of private justice for dispute resolution purposes alone. It's also a
place in which arguments about the meaning of law and constitutional
values are ventilated and carried on. Courts themselves are an important
part of the life of a deliberative polity like ours, and for that reason I
think that the view that courts are just there for the private convenience
of the litigants is simply a false idea about courts.
Given all this, one of the questions is, what's the best way of
enforcing some kind of sunshine-in-litigation regime? The usual way,
exemplified in the Texas statute that Richard Zitrin talked about, or the
Florida and Washington statutes, is by enacting a law preventing the
secret settlement. Alternatively, I would regard it as an issue of judicial
ethics that the judge should not seal the documents and the settlement. If
so, it is very important to educate judges so that they don't instinctively
say to themselves, "The plaintiff wants the secret settlement; the defend-
ant wants it; I want the matter off my docket, so let's seal the settlement
and watch the case go away."
In contrast to these approaches, Richard's suggestion is an ethical
rule for lawyers. Although I agree with him on his diagnosis of the prob-
lem, I do not agree with him on the proposed solution. I don't think that
the ethical rule would be a particularly good idea.
What does it mean to say that the lawyers cannot participate in
negotiating a secret settlement? Let's consider the defense lawyer first.
Does the rule mean that the defense lawyer should not counsel the client
to offer a generous settlement in return for secrecy? That seems like an
unjustifiable interference with the lawyer/client relationship and the free
speech rights of the defense lawyer. Does it mean that the lawyer has to
tell the client, "I can't negotiate this settlement for you"? Does it mean
that the lawyer tells the client, "If you want to make that settlement offer,
I can't even communicate it to the other side for you"? None of these
seems acceptable.
Next let's look at the plaintiff's lawyer. Does the rule mean that the
plaintiffs lawyer must tell the client, "I cannot negotiate a secret settle-
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ment for you. Ethics forbids it. If the other side makes the offer, I can't
even communicate it to you. If you want to accept it, I can't communi-
cate your acceptance back to the other side. And if you ask me whether
it's a good idea to accept it, the ethics rules seal my lips"?
Now, it seems to me that all that would happen is at that point,
defendants would say, "If my lawyer won't have this settlement conver-
sation with the plaintiff, I'll just have it directly." They would simply
make an end run around the lawyers who are now estopped from partici-
pating in and negotiating the secret settlement.
This might be good news for the accountants. If lawyers won't do
it, the accountants will. Now the defense accountant approaches the
plaintiff's accountant and offers a secret settlement, which the plaintiffs
accountant accepts. Of course, the state bar declares that this is unau-
thorized practice of law, and files a lawsuit. But the judge throws it out
because the judge says, "According to the ethics rules, this isn't the prac-
tice of law at all. Lawyers can't negotiate secret settlements." So this
would be a rule that would provide a lot of new professional opportuni-
ties for nonlawyers.
Alternatively, lawyers might still be able to negotiate secret settle-
ments because the rule might be easy to game. According to the rule, the
lawyer is forbidden from negotiating the settlement once the lawyer rea-
sonably believes that there is a substantial danger to the public health or
safety. The lawyer will now try to negotiate the settlement before inves-
tigating the case far enough to form that reasonable belief. A lawyer on
a contingency fee will have a strong incentive to do so, and a lawyer who
is immune from financial considerations of a personal nature will still
want to settle on behalf of the client because of compassion for the client.
Finally, I think that the rule as stated might be difficult to apply in
many cases. This is not an objection in principle to eliminating secret
settlements through an ethics rule, but it is an objection to the way Rich-
ard's rule is phrased.
Richard's rule is difficult to apply because it is very difficult to
know what counts as a "substantial danger" to the public health or safety
in a mass exposure context. Suppose I as the lawyer obtain discovery
information showing that one of these gas tanks out of 10,000 explodes.
Is that a substantial danger, or an insubstantial danger? I think that it is
very hard to tell. Similarly, if I know that a pharmaceutical raises the
risk of cancer by one percent so that cancer in the exposed population
occurs one percent more often than in the baseline population, would I
consider that a substantial risk or an insubstantial risk? Here, too, I think
that it would be very difficult for anyone to tell.
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If I am right about this, the rule probably would not be used much
by lawyers in mass exposure or mass accident cases because the lawyer
still has client-based and personal incentives to negotiate the secret set-
tlement, which is after all a windfall for that client.
So I think on the whole that the best way to handle the problem of
secret settlement is probably not through an ethics rule but through sun-
shine-in-litigation legislation and through a judiciary that would be much
more vigilant than it is now in policing this process, and in not giving a
blanket presumption that if the parties want a secret settlement, a secret
settlement is a good thing. Not every case that can be settled ought to be
settled, and it's the judiciary's job to realize that some settlements are not
in the public interest and should not be approved. Thank you.
